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   Section 1 




This decade may well turn out to be the most tumultuous in the history of U.S. housing 
markets. The period from 2000 to 2006 saw an unprecedented acceleration in home 
prices almost everywhere, and homeownership expanded markedly as access to 
subprime loans and other factors made it much easier for lower-income families to 
purchase a home of their own. Then it all fell apart. Prices in most regions have since 
plummeted and foreclosure rates have increased dramatically. Almost all American 
communities are affected, but levels of foreclosure are much higher in some 
neighborhoods and metropolitan areas than others. 
 
Recognizing that this turnabout was still quite new, in mid-2008 the Open Society 
Institute asked the Urban Institute to scan available research and other sources to 
assess how much we now know about the way foreclosures impact families and 
communities, and then to offer initial suggestions on what the findings have to say about 
the need for additional research and about how to address the crisis at the local level. 
Doing the latter required that we also devote some attention to available information on 
the efforts now underway to respond to the foreclosure crisis in various metropolitan 
areas.  
 
This report is one of the outputs of this work. It attempts to distill the important findings 
and recommendations from the review in a manner that will be useful to local leaders 
and practitioners working on the issue in their own communities. Local practitioners are 
likely to be most interested in ideas about how to address the crisis, but boiling down a 
better understanding of the impacts should also be useful to them, both in designing a 
strategy that fits local conditions and in motivating local decisionmakers to provide 
adequate support.  
 





Accordingly, this paper has three main sections: impacts on families, impacts on 
communities, and the foreclosure response system. A final section offers the authors’ 
views on priorities for further research in these areas. The contents of the first three 
main sections are as follows: 
 
 
Impacts on Families 
 
It is important to recognize at the outset that, while a considerable amount has been 
written recently about some aspects of the foreclosure crisis—its incidence, its causes, 
and its implications for the financial system—comparatively little research has been 
completed on its local impacts, the central subject of this project. That is understandable 
in part because the crisis is itself so recent. Researchers have not had the time to gather 
and assess evidence on what is taking place. 
 
There is another and more troubling reason, however, for the dearth of information about 
impacts on families—namely, that the families affected by foreclosure are extremely 
difficult to identify and track. At some point between the first notice and soon after the 
completion of a foreclosure, the family that has been living in the property (renter or 
owner) typically moves out; there is no easy way to find them again. Assembling a list of 
new addresses for these families, as would be needed for a reliable survey on how they 
were affected, is prohibitively expensive after the fact.  
 
We have addressed this problem in two ways. First, even though there is little evidence 
on what happens to families post-foreclosure, there has been considerable research on 
what happens to families after they move for other reasons; these are the references we 
have relied on in this paper. The literature pertaining to families that were forced to move 
because of problems in their lives (loss of a job, family changes, illness, or other 
circumstances leading to eviction) is particularly relevant to this issue.  
 
Second, we conducted a series of interviews with individuals who have been dealing 
with families at risk of foreclosure (employees of counseling agencies, legal services 
groups, etc.). While these individuals cannot report with certainty on what happens to 
these families after foreclosure, they have been close enough to offer reasonable 
speculations about likely outcomes. Their views of the characteristics of these families 
and what may be happening to them offer at least a basis for forming hypotheses.  
 
When foreclosures occur, the families living in the foreclosed properties are almost 
always obligated to move, but other effects may well touch on virtually all aspects of their 
well-being. The major types of impacts and questions that guided our inquiry within each 
are as follows: 






• Displacement and Housing Instability. Where did the families affected by 
foreclosure move? How did they decide where to go? What are the 
characteristics of their new housing and neighborhoods in comparison to those 
they left behind? To what extent and in what ways are they doubling up with 
other households? To what extent did foreclosures result in homelessness? How 
many moved to a different city? 
• Financial Insecurity and Economic Hardship. How did the household’s financial 
circumstances change as a result of the foreclosure (i.e., assets, debts, net 
worth, credit rating) and how are they coping with these changes? How many 
receive public assistance after the foreclosure? Did the foreclosure result in 
employment change for one or more adults in the household? If so, how do the 
new jobs compare to those held before? 
• Personal and Family Stress, Disrupted Relationships, and Ill Health. Did the 
family split or add members due to the foreclosure process? Which members left 
and what was their situation after the change (the characteristics of their new 
household or institution)? Did the foreclosure and related events have effects on 
the physical and mental health of adults in the family? If so, what types and how 
severe? Did the foreclosure and its aftermath lead to negative behaviors (e.g., 
spousal abuse, child abuse, and neglect)? 
 
This section explicitly recognizes that the nature of the impacts in each category is likely 
to vary for different types of families. There are many ways that families can be 
characterized, but within our review of findings we will focus on impacts for three groups 
in particular: renters, children, and the elderly. 
 
For example, the legal protections for renters in the foreclosure process are normally 
weak to nonexistent1—renters are usually summarily evicted—and, although the 
financial losses may not be as sizeable as those for many owners, they too face financial 
losses. Children must be singled out because they are likely to be affected more deeply 
than adults by foreclosure impacts (e.g., being forced to move to a new neighborhood 
and school, loss of friendships, disruption in daily routines, stress within the family). 
Similarly, the elderly are particularly vulnerable—financially, physically, and 
emotionally—to such major disruptions as foreclosure implies, and strategies for 












Impacts on Communities 
 
There are also three major types of impacts on neighborhoods and communities. Within 
each of these categories we are particularly mindful that the extent of the impacts can 
vary dramatically across different neighborhoods and cities. In some cases, where there 
are only a few foreclosures and steps are taken to minimize the time the properties 
stand vacant, impacts may be slight. In contrast, where the number of foreclosures is 
sizeable in a compact area, there may well be strong secondary effects on nearby 
properties and the impact on the neighborhood as a whole can be dramatic.  
 
• Declining Property Values and Physical Deterioration. Given metropolitan market 
conditions, to what extent are various levels of initial foreclosures in a 
neighborhood likely to induce additional foreclosures? How are various levels of 
foreclosure likely to affect vacancy rates and then property values and physical 
conditions? What are the trends in rates of structural fires and the 
undermaintenance of properties and public spaces?  
• Crime, Social Disorder, and Population Turnover. What effects are varying levels 
of foreclosures and vacancies likely to have on physical and social conditions in 
the neighborhood; more specifically, on measures such as crime rates, public 
health, and school performance? How are foreclosures and accompanying 
neighborhood changes likely to alter the rates at which families move in and out 
of the neighborhood and the characteristics of both streams of migrants? How do 
these alter the balance between owners and renters in the neighborhood? 
• Local Government Fiscal Stress and Deterioration of Services. What additional 
activities by local government will be required to directly address the 
neighborhood impacts, and what are their probable costs (administrative costs 
related to the foreclosure process, as well as the costs of additional fire and 
police protection and maintenance activities)? How might the response to the 
foreclosure crisis strain the city’s capacity (i.e., divert resources so as to diminish 
performance in other programs and neighborhoods)? What impact will 
foreclosures have on property taxes and other local government revenues? 
 
 
The Foreclosure Response System 
 
The answers to the questions posed above about the impacts of foreclosures on families 
and neighborhoods suggest a framework for examining the types of policies and 
programs that attempt to prevent or mitigate those impacts. This section reviews 
literature on the response systems being developed for that purpose and is divided into 
four major components.  
  





• Develop a Coordinated Foreclosure Response Strategy. What individual 
institutions are participating in the local response system and what are their roles 
and capacities? What policy and regulatory changes are being proposed and 
implemented locally to facilitate the work of the response system and otherwise 
mitigate the local affects of the crisis? What analyses have been done on the 
extent and nature of the foreclosure problem at the local or metropolitan level as 
the basis for a strategy? What coordinated strategies have been developed? 
What systems have been established to monitor changes in the nature and 
extent of the foreclosure problem and the performance of local foreclosure 
response efforts? 
• Prevent Foreclosures and Keep Families in Their Homes. What programs are in 
place to counsel, help negotiate loan modifications, and otherwise support 
owners in default to prevent foreclosure? What are their capacities and how have 
they performed? 
• Stabilize Neighborhoods. What programs exist to secure vacant properties, 
sustain them in good condition, and reduce adverse impacts on the surrounding 
neighborhood? What programs exist to expedite the reoccupancy of foreclosed 
properties either to renters or new owners? What programs are in place to 
acquire foreclosed properties, rehabilitate them, and hold them in the public 
interest?  
• Help Families Recover. What programs exist to help families with relocation and 
other impacts after foreclosures occur (including programs aimed at helping 
renters as well as owners)?  
 
We have identified and reviewed references under all of these categories. However, this 
section of the report gives more emphasis to categories that deal with impacts after 
foreclosures have occurred, rather than the category that covers the prevention of 
foreclosures. In the section on developing a coordinated foreclosure response strategy, 
we also focus on addressing secondary impacts, although we recognize that coherent 
strategies must consider both prevention and impact mitigation simultaneously. 
 















   Section 2 




Behind each foreclosure is a family, or multiple families, whose lives will change. While 
change is not necessarily negative, there is considerable concern that the changes 
experienced by families as part of the current foreclosure crisis will lead to poor 
outcomes. Historically, households entered foreclosure primarily when a precipitating 
event such as divorce, job loss, illness, or accident dramatically changed a family’s 
financial situation. In addition to these triggering events, much of the current foreclosure 
wave was fueled by widespread use of high-cost, unsuitable loans; a sharp decline in 
property values; and a softening housing market. This situation (including related 
investment vehicles) contributed to the nationwide recession. 
 
Such troubled economic times are not good environments for families trying to bounce 
back from foreclosure. These families are likely to be financially vulnerable and may be 
experiencing illness, job loss, or other traumas. While this is not unexpected of families 
facing foreclosure, the number of households in crisis coupled with the economic 
downturn exacerbates problems. Families in foreclosure need help at a time when 
people, organizations, and institutions that may be traditional sources of assistance are 
overburdened and underfunded. With unemployment rising, coming back from a job loss 
is made even more difficult. Even though we can speculate that foreclosure is hard on 
families and that foreclosure during these trying days is even more difficult, there is little 
research on specific foreclosure-related impacts on families or on the magnitude, 
incidence, and longevity of those impacts. 
 
To fill the research void on foreclosure-related impacts, this section reviews what we 
know happens to families when they move for other reasons, especially when such 
moves are not spurred by positive events. While we know that foreclosure has some 
elements that differentiate it from other forms of eviction or displacement (such as the 





uncompensated loss of a major financial investment), a review of this related literature 
helps us see what we can expect are the impacts of foreclosure on families. In addition, 
as noted in section 1, we spoke with people working with families currently at risk of and 
in foreclosure to gather their views on what happens to families. 
 
This section begins with a short review of the foreclosure process. When foreclosures 
occur, the families living in foreclosed properties are almost always obligated to move, 
but other effects may well touch on virtually all aspects of their well-being. The majority 
of this section discusses foreclosure-related impacts on families and is divided into three 
categories: 
 
• Displacement and Housing Instability, 
• Financial Insecurity and Economic Hardship, and 
• Personal and Family Stress, Disrupted Relationships, and Ill Health 
 
The nature of the impacts will vary for different types of families. A key distinction when 
understanding and anticipating potential impacts is the family’s tenure type—are they 
homeowners or renters? As the crisis began to unfold, policy concerns focused almost 
solely on owners, but a number of recent studies have shown that rental units make up a 
sizeable share of all units in properties being foreclosed. The rental share has been 
estimated at 38 percent nationally,2 but is as high is 45 percent for New England3 and 60 
percent in New York City.4 
 
Moreover, certain groups such as children and senior citizens may have particular needs 
and be subject to certain impacts. To the extent that information is available for different 
tenure types or groups, it will be woven in to the discussion of three major categories of 
impacts on families listed above. 
 
 
The Foreclosure Process 
 
Foreclosure is an abridged name for the legal process that a lender must follow to take 
possession of a property after an owner defaults on a mortgage.5 In states where the law 
prescribes a “judicial” approach, the process starts when a lender, in effect, sues the 
borrower for failing to make payments consistent with the loan agreement (in some 
states this entails filing a Notice of Lis Pendens). The parties are then supposed to 
appear before a judge, where the lender must demonstrate that the claim is valid. If the 
judge agrees that the borrower is in default, he or she sets a date when the property will 
be sold. In fact, in the vast majority of cases, the borrower does not appear, leading to 
the entry of a default judgment. 
 





Many states, however, have a “nonjudicial” foreclosure process. In these states, when 
lenders find borrowers to be in default on the mortgage, they simply send a Notice of 
Foreclosure (also called Notice of Default) to the borrowers directly with a copy to the 
recorder of deeds. The lender sets the date of the prospective sale consistent with the 
mortgage terms. If the borrower contends that the debt is not valid, he or she must 
challenge and potentially bring suit against the lender to halt the foreclosure process. 
 
Under either approach, the sale can be averted if the borrower meets all outstanding 
obligations beforehand or alternatively enters into a new “workout agreement” with the 
lender. If either of these occurs, the foreclosure process is cancelled by filing an 
appropriate notice with the recorder of deeds. 
 
Under both legal systems, if the borrower is unable to stop the process, the property is 
offered for sale at a public auction and title is transferred to the highest bidder. Typically, 
however, the lender sets a minimum price and if there are no bids above that price, the 
title reverts to the lender. When the latter occurs, as it often does, particularly in weak 
markets, the property is termed real estate owned, or REO. In most places, if the 
property has been rented, the tenants are subject to eviction as soon as the title has 
been transferred, even if they are up to date on their rent. They do not have the legal 
protections with respect to eviction they would have had with the former owner. 
  
 
Displacement and Housing Instability 
 
Residents of foreclosed properties are almost always forced to move. The most logical 
question about these families is, where do they go? We have not been able to identify 
any systematic information that would enable us to answer this question reliably, even 
for one city—no doubt for the reasons enumerated in section 1.  
 
The National Coalition for the Homeless asked the question in a survey of homeless 
coalitions; they received responses from groups in 29 states.6 The most frequent 
response was “staying with family and friends,” and large numbers also talked of families 
going to emergency shelters and even living on the streets, although many also thought 
former homeowners with more resources were able to find places to rent. However, 
more respondents said they got their information from the media than from shelter 
operators or others who dealt with the families directly. Counselors and others we 
interviewed as a part of this study generally thought these same responses were the 
most likely for low-income groups, but they too lacked direct contact with many families 
after foreclosures occurred. 
 





There is general concern that foreclosure is the first step on a path of unstable housing 
for some former homeowners and renters but without reliable data, there is no clear 
answer on when, where, how, or if families in foreclosure are rehoused. Homeowners in 
foreclosure see their credit ratings plummet, making it difficult to purchase or rent 
another home. Even if a family can find a landlord willing to rent to them, many have 
used up any financial reserves during the foreclosure process, making down payments 
or deposits difficult. 
 
Renters may be given short notice of an eviction due to the foreclosure of their building. 
If they do not leave once served by a notice of eviction they may be sued, with the 
resulting lawsuit on their rental record.7 Even those who leave may not be refunded rent 
or security deposits they might use to secure a new unit. 
 
We know that the homeless shelter system is seeing an increase in people served, 
suggesting that some families in foreclosure, both former owners and renters, move into 
homelessness.8 Our interview respondents suspect these increases will grow, given that 
a first move for families experiencing foreclosure might be to double up with family and 
friends. As these housing arrangements deteriorate over time, additional families will 
become homeless. 
 
Since there is no sound research on where the families move, we also do not know how 
the properties and neighborhoods where foreclosed families previously lived compare to 
their new locations. For homeowners, the family’s decline in financial resources and 
credit standing do not bode well for a positive change. Some studies say that rental 
housing is more expensive than owned housing of comparable size and quality, 
suggesting that families may not be able to afford something better or on par with where 
they were living prior to foreclosure.9 Other studies report that when households 
(particularly low-income households) must make relatively quick housing decisions, they 
are more likely to make poor choices.10 This is particularly troubling for renters who may 
be given short notice of eviction. Moreover, some renters may have a history of housing 
instability that is intensified with the foreclosure-related move. 
 
Housing instability is very worrisome for groups who may be hit hard by volatility and 
change. Persons at the ends of the age range—the very old and the very young—are of 
special concern. We know the elderly are often adversely affected by moving, 
particularly forced or involuntary relocation.11 Moving can trigger a series of emotional 
and physical setbacks from which older people may not recover. The importance of 
place for seniors is well documented.12 As health declines and independence lessens, 
seniors rely on their connections to place to help them control and predict their 
environment during a time of life when other areas are increasingly out of their control.13 
 





Whereas a single move can be quite traumatic for an older person, multiple moves may 
contribute to poor outcomes for kids. There is concern that foreclosure may be part of a 
path of ongoing housing instability for families. This could have profound and lasting 
impacts on children. Lack of a stable home can negatively influence behavior and social 
development. Frequent school change is related to poor academic performance and 
educational attainment.14 Housing instability can also contribute to “family turbulence” 
that inhibits a parent’s ability to keep a consistent bedtime, mealtime, or homework 
schedule, all of which can have negative outcomes for children.15 What heightens 
concerns about the effects of housing stability on young children is the longevity of the 
consequences. Findings suggest that school-age children who move frequently during 




Financial Insecurity and Economic Hardship 
 
The financial losses associated with foreclosure are substantial. For homeowners, credit 
ratings are damaged, which affects their ability to move on to a new home and lessens 
their ability to get loans for other purchases.17 Poor credit ratings may also negatively 
influence terms and prices for services such as insurance and may impede efforts to get 
jobs, because some employers access credit ratings for new hires.18 The net worth for 
homeowners in foreclosure decreases, since they lose their home as an asset along with 
any accumulated equity and the tax advantages of homeownership. In the mid-1990s, 
the Family Housing Fund in Minneapolis estimated the average family lost $7,200 
through foreclosure.19 Current estimates are most likely higher, as figures are adjusted 
for inflation and recent decreases in housing values further erode equity and negate 
previous financial investments in the foreclosed home. One observer noted, “foreclosure 
can wipe out the homeowners’ savings and leave them owing debt on homes they no 
longer own.”20 
 
While renters may not see the same type of financial impacts from foreclosure, they too 
can be adversely affected. As noted above, they may not receive (or not in a timely 
manner) monies to which they are entitled. They also incur the costs associated with a 
housing search (application fees, credit checks) and moving. Furthermore, a move has 
the potential to lead to less-affordable housing situations with possible increases in 
monthly household costs such as rent, utilities, and transportation. 
 
The financial implications of foreclosure are gloomy but do not necessarily evoke 
economic hardship for all families, depending on their other assets and job status. That 
said, we would expect that a significant number of households in foreclosure would 
experience economic hardship. We do not know how many of these families will receive 





help from private sources (personal loans, food banks, etc.) or access public assistance 
(TANF, the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program, etc.). We know that the states 
with the highest rates of foreclosure in the current crisis (Nevada, Florida, Arizona, and 
California) also saw their food stamp caseloads jump by almost 20 percent in 2008.21 
We also know that the rise of mortgage default and foreclosure rates in the 1990s was 
accompanied by an increase in personal bankruptcy.22 While troubled economic times 
make it unwise to attribute these increases to foreclosure, we expect some portion of 
families experiencing foreclosure are reflected in these and other measures of economic 
hardship. Hardship is easiest to see in the lives of individual families that report dramatic 
impacts as they “lose everything,” have no place to live, and must start over. 
 
Starting over is not always an option for older Americans. Little is known about the 
financial impact of foreclosure on older persons, but given the overwhelmingly negative 
financial implications coupled with declining home values, we can expect older 
Americans involved in foreclosure will be particularly hard hit, given the limited time and 
incomes they have to recover from such a setback. Our interview respondents were 
particularly concerned about this group, since they may be more vulnerable to the 
machinations of opportunistic family members and predatory lenders. In some instances, 
unscrupulous family members may have put the senior’s housing in jeopardy with an 
unwise refinance package. Historically, older Americans relied on their homes for 
financial security and as a retirement safety net. While this is still the case for many, 
owners increasingly carry mortgage debt into their retirement years, with more than half 
of all households with a head over 50 currently carrying a mortgage.23 
 
While little is documented regarding the financial effects of foreclosure specifically for 
older Americans, we can speak to the size of the potential problem and thus 
characterize its importance. AARP says that in the last half of 2007, 28 percent of all 
mortgage delinquencies and foreclosures were held by household heads age 50 and 
older.24 They also note that in cases where the loan-to-value ratio is greater than 100 
percent (which is growing given falling home values), the foreclosure rate of persons 
over 50 is double the national rate, suggesting that persons with more fixed incomes find 
sustaining high debt levels particularly difficult.25 
 
 
Personal and Family Stress, Disrupted Relationships, and Ill Health 
 
The disruption, displacement, and economic impacts of foreclosure are substantial but 
do not exhaust the list of possible effects experienced by families. Repercussions may 
be felt in many areas, from parenting to self-esteem, as turmoil, fear, and uncertainty 
rise. For some families, increased personal and family stress feeds marital problems and 
exacerbates negative behaviors (child abuse, addictions, etc.). Stress may also have a 





negative effect on health, as do compromised or unsanitary housing conditions. While 
these effects are in some ways the most difficult to document, they are serious and 
troubling, with long-term consequences. 
 
Stress is a part of everyday life, but high levels of stress and poor coping mechanisms 
can contribute to a host of physical and mental illnesses. It can be assumed that most, if 
not all, people involved in foreclosure have some kind of anxiety and stress. Our 
interview respondents were generally in agreement that the trauma of losing one’s home 
with all the related confusion, shame, and fear is damaging to the emotional and 
physical health of adults. We know that stress exacerbates chronic conditions and 
damages body systems.26 We also know that stress negatively affects mental well-being. 
A dramatic example of the damage to mental health can be seen in suicide by people 
facing foreclosure (and related financial ruin).27 While the number of calls to crisis 
hotlines is up, as well as requests for therapists, it is difficult to determine what is related 
specifically to foreclosure.28 None of our interview respondents offered to estimate the 
magnitude of the problem or the long-term effects on mental and physical health. 
However, a noted psychologist said to ABC News, “It is very depressing to lose one’s 
home. It represents loss of stability, a feeling of failure…It is scary and overwhelming.”29 
 
Families in foreclosure may be more vulnerable to health crises than other families. We 
know that poor health, with related costs and missed employment, contributes to a 
significant number of mortgage defaults. Estimates from credible reports vary (from 22 to 
50 percent) but we know that poor health is a major contributing factor in foreclosure 
filings.30 For individuals already in poor health, the stress of foreclosure may be 
particularly dire. This would include the threat to older Americans, who are more likely to 
be battling chronic health conditions. We also know this group finds relocation and 
adjusting to new neighborhoods very stressful.31 
 
There are concerns that incidents of spousal and child abuse may escalate among 
households under the stress of foreclosure. We know that financial stress is a major 
contributor to domestic violence. There is no systematic evidence to address this issue 
as related to foreclosure, and our interview respondents were uneasy in attempting to 
estimate or generalize about such situations but felt they were likely to be happening. 
They noted raised voices and increased tension during office visits with families in 
foreclosure. 
 















   Section 3 




As noted in the introduction, there are three major types of impacts of foreclosures on 
neighborhoods and communities.  
 
• Declining Property Values and Physical Deterioration; 
• Crime, Social Disorder, and Population Turnover; and 
• Local Government Fiscal Stress and Deterioration of Services 
 
The main purpose of this section is to summarize what is known about each. However, 
the nature and extent of these impacts will differ in important ways in different types of 
neighborhoods. Accordingly, before we consider the impacts we briefly introduce 
information on the way the problem varies across types of neighborhoods. 
 
 
Variations across Neighborhoods 
 
It would be ideal to be able to examine the likely pattern of foreclosures directly, but 
complete and consistent national data on foreclosures are not available. However, 
subprime lending densities should serve as a reasonably good proxy.32 Some who have 
studied the current crises have looked at data on subprime loans as a share of total 
lending in an area, but that is not a good indicator of probable impact. An area could 
have a very high subprime share but a very low volume of total lending, so that the 
number of risky loans was very small in relation to the size of the housing stock. A much 
better measure for this purpose is the number of subprime loans per 1,000 existing 
housing units (in 1–4 unit structures). This can be thought of as the “density” of subprime 
lending, and it is the density that generally heightens the risk of foreclosure and negative 
spillover effects like declines in property values and increasing crime rates.  







DENSITY OF SUBPRIME LOANS BY PREDOMINANT RACE AND POVERTY  
RATE OF CENSUS TRACT, 100 LARGEST METRO AREAS 














Source: G. Thomas Kingsley and Kathryn L. S. Pettit. 2009. High-Cost and Investor Mortgages: 
Neighborhood Patterns. Washington, DC: The Urban Institute. 
 
Figures cited below are average densities of subprime (high-cost) loans per year from 
2004 through 2006 for the 100 largest metropolitan areas (from an analysis by the Urban 
Institute).33 The measure varies dramatically for different types of neighborhoods. 
 
First, there are major differences by the predominant race of the neighborhood. For the 
large metros nationally, the rate was 13 on average across all tracts and 11 where 
whites were the predominant race. (We define a predominant race as one accounting for 
60 percent or more of a tract’s 2000 population.) The subprime density was a much 
higher 20 where blacks predominate, 19 where Hispanics were the predominant group, 
and 19 when another race was predominant or there was no predominant race. But 
there were major variations depending on the poverty rate of the tract as well. For these 
areas, across all races, the density was highest at 17 in the groups with 20–30 percent 
living below the federal poverty level and almost as high (16) for those in the 10–20 
percent group and for the highest (more than 30 percent below the federal poverty level) 
group. It stood at only 11 for tracts with poverty rates below 10 percent. 






Putting both variables together for the 100 largest metros, figure 1 shows a strikingly 
contrasting pattern. Within race categories, subprime densities are almost always 
highest in the lowest-poverty category and drop down consistently as poverty rates 
increase. The highest densities occur where Hispanics are predominant, ranging from 28 
per 1,000 units in low-poverty tracts down to 16 in the highest-poverty group. 
Predominantly African American tracts come next, with 26 in the lowest-poverty group 
and 17 in the highest.  
 
In short, the neighborhoods hardest hit by the subprime crisis have been those where 
minority residents predominate, but within those, the highest subprime densities are 
found in those with higher-, not moderate- or lower-income, residents. This may seem 
surprising, but it occurs because of a point noted earlier. Subprime loans do account for 
a higher “share” of all loans in poorer neighborhoods, but because the volume of home 
lending (per 1,000 units) is so much lower in such neighborhoods, subprime “densities” 
are lower there as a result.  
 
 
Foreclosures and High Foreclosure Density—the Expected Scenario 
 
What is it about the foreclosure process that creates deleterious impacts for 
neighborhoods? Several factors may be involved: 
 
• After receiving a notice of foreclosure, the original owner may defer maintenance 
to try to keep up with payments. 
• After the foreclosure, the home may remain vacant for a period of time with no 
one keeping it secured and well maintained while it is vacant. 
• A high concentration of foreclosure sales in an area will lower comparables and 
knowledge of them may diminish lender confidence. 
 
Periods of vacancy are among the most problematic. In many cases, the title to the 
property has been transferred back to the lender and the properties have become REOs. 
If the property is in a neighborhood with a strong real estate market (i.e., increasing 
prices), the lender has a powerful incentive to avoid prolonged vacancy and 
deterioration. A substantial profit can be made if the property is sold quickly, and the 
lender will want to maintain it in good condition while it is on the market. 
 
If, however, the home is in a neighborhood where prices are lower and declining, those 
incentives disappear. The lender may try to avoid spending anything on securing and 
maintaining it. In fact, following through on the legal process that leads to foreclosure 
can be very costly, since the lender has to pay attorneys fees and cover property 





management and other services (estimated at around $40,000 to $50,000 in the 
Washington, D.C., area).34 There are many reports of lenders paying cash to residents 
to get them to move out without formal eviction (the “cash for keys” approach). 
Alternatively, whether the home is occupied or not, the lender may decide that the least 
costly approach is to simply walk away, leaving the property unattended in a sort of legal 
limbo. 
 
When the property is vacant and it is evident that no one is taking care of it, realtors and 
prospective buyers will take note and see that as a threat of potential decline in 
neighborhood property values. A modest amount of undermaintenance may not have 
much effect, but things can get worse. The property may be invaded by squatters or by 
vandals who gut it (i.e., remove anything of value, including copper piping and hardwood 
floors as well as appliances). Some unsecured homes may become drug houses. A 
wider array of criminals sensing the disorder may lead to increased risks of crimes of all 
types for residents in surrounding homes and apartments.35  
 
As the period of vacancy is extended, and no one is paying for heat and electricity or 
maintenance, the building will begin to deteriorate physically. The likelihood of structural 
fire goes up, in some cases because indoor fires set by squatters to keep warm get out 
of control. There are also stories of unscrupulous owners of rental properties in default 
who to continue to collect rent from tenants for as long as they can, but stop paying for 
maintenance until they finally lose title (i.e., the property declines physically even though 
it is still occupied). 
 
In a strong market neighborhood, one or two foreclosures may not be much of a 
concern. There are natural self-correction mechanisms in play. The surrounding owners, 
with considerable equity in their homes, are likely to exert great pressure on the owner of 
the affected property, the government, and anyone else who might be able to help get 
the problem corrected one way or another as soon as possible. But suppose the number 
of foreclosures jumps from 2 to 20. The problem is much more serious and harder to 
correct. It is not the existence of any foreclosures but a high density of foreclosures that 
creates serious impacts on neighborhoods. 
 
In a weak market neighborhood, where property values may be going down already, 
even a small number of foreclosures are likely to accelerate the trend, and a higher 
density of them would do so yet more rapidly. Depending in part on the metropolitan 
context, a continuation of these trends can well lead to substantial abandonment and 
losses of neighborhood population. 









Declining Property Values and Physical Deterioration 
 
There has now been considerable research to demonstrate that the outcomes predicted 
in the above scenario do in fact occur. The first analysis of note, by Dan Immergluck and 
Geoff Smith, entailed hedonic regression analysis relating data on 3,750 1997–1998 
foreclosures in Chicago to 9,600 single-family property sales transactions in 1999.36 The 
analysis showed that foreclosures indeed had an impact. They found that each new 
foreclosure within one-eighth mile of a home resulted in a 0.9 percent decline in the 
value of that home (i.e., more foreclosures means more declines at that amount). In low- 
and moderate-income neighborhoods, they found that the marginal drop in property 
value from one new foreclosure in the same radius was 1.8 percent. 
 
More recently, others have employed similar techniques and found varying results in 
different cities.37 The most compelling to date, by John P. Harding, Eric Rosenblatt, and 
Vincent W. Yao, was based on foreclosure and sales data for 140 zip codes in 13 states 
(628,000 repeat sales transactions).38 They found a negative effect on values of 1.3 
percent within a 300-foot radius of the home (i.e., a foreclosure probably in one of the 
nearest two to three properties), but a drop of only 0.6 percent for a one-eighth mile (660 
feet) radius (i.e., a foreclosure probably in the next block). This level is one-third lower 
than that found in the initial Chicago study for the same distance. 
 
The Center for Responsible Lending has made estimates of possible national and state 
impacts on property values, applying the results of the Chicago study to their own data 
on foreclosures.39 They now project that around 2.2 million foreclosures of subprime 
loans will occur primarily in late 2008 through the end of 2009, and that 40.6 million 
homes in neighborhoods will suffer price declines averaging $8,667 per home, resulting 
in a $352 billion total decline in property values. Applying the results of the broader-
based study by Harding, Rosenblatt, and Yao would reduce these estimates, 
presumably by one-third (to a $5,780 per home average and a $235 billion total). Even in 
the latter case, the results will be traumatic nationally. 
  
 
Crime, Social Disorder, and Population Turnover 
 
Research has also been conducted that supports the effects hypothesized in our 
scenario of foreclosures on crime. One local example is a study conducted by the 
Charlotte-Mecklenburg (North Carolina) Police Department. They identified 13 





neighborhoods in their metropolis with high “clusters of foreclosure” from 2003 through 
2007—typically not the area’s most distressed neighborhoods but places where home 
prices were considered to be in an “affordable” range ($90,000 to $150,000). They then 
identified another 12 neighborhoods in the same price range that had not yet had high 
levels of foreclosure. They found that violent and property crime rates had gone up in 
both types of neighborhoods but that they were significantly higher in the high-
foreclosure clusters. In 2005 and 2006, there was an annual average of 1.7 violent crime 
incidents per 100 houses in high-foreclosure clusters, almost three times the 0.6 
average for the comparison group.40 
 
A more carefully constructed statistical analysis was conducted for Chicago. The 
researchers’ regression analysis related crimes in all census tracts in 2001 to tract 
foreclosure rates (foreclosures per 100 owner-occupied properties in 2001) and a host of 
other neighborhood characteristics. They found the relationship between foreclosures 
and violent crime to be statistically significant and sizeable. “A 1 percentage point 
increase in the foreclosure rate (which has a standard deviation of 0.028) is expected to 
increase the number of violent crimes in a tract by 2.33 percent, all other things being 
equal. A full standard deviation increase in the foreclosure rate is expected to increase 
the violent crime rate by 6.68 percent.” While the effect on property crime was not found 
to be statistically significant, the coefficient in the regression was positive.41 
 
So far, we know of no well-documented case studies of neighborhoods suffering 
substantial abandonment or population loss primarily due to a high density of 
foreclosures. However, there are anecdotal accounts about this happening, for example, 
in recently built suburban developments where subprime loans predominated and there 
had been significant overbuilding and, more broadly, in some of the nation’s weakest 
housing markets, like Detroit.  
 
 
Local Government Fiscal Stress and Deterioration of Services 
 
The final impacts of the foreclosure crisis to be reviewed in this section are those that 
befall local governments. On one hand, given the discussion above on how foreclosures 
reduce property values in a neighborhood, there will obviously be a reduction in the 
property taxes that the local government can derive, so municipal revenues will go down. 
Less obvious perhaps is that, on the other side of the equation, an increase in 
expenditures will be inevitable. 
 
It is now well known that America’s local governments are facing dire fiscal problems. An 
April–June 2008 survey of city finance officers by the National League of Cities (NLC) 
yielded these findings: 42 






• 64 percent reported that their cities were less able to meet fiscal needs in 2008 
than in the previous year. 
• They predicted that in 2008, revenues will decrease by 4.3 percent and spending 
will decrease by 1.5 percent. 
• Property tax revenues are expected to decline by 3.6 percent by the end of 2008. 
 
There are many causes for these problems, but foreclosures and the declining housing 
market rank prominently among them. In another NLC survey, elected officials were 
asked what conditions had impacted their communities most severely. “Increased 
foreclosures” came in third behind “decreased city revenues” and “decreased funding for 
other programs and projects.”43 Of the respondents, 62 percent said that foreclosures 
had increased some or a lot over the past year and one-third said the same about 




COSTS OF FORECLOSURES TO LOCAL GOVERNMENT 
        A B C D E 
    Vacant & Vacant & Vacant & Vacant & Abandoned
    secured unsecured unsecured unsecured & fire 
     conserve. demolish abandoned damage 
Cost       $430  $5,358  $13,452  $19,227  $34,199  
         
Lis Pendens filing   J J J J J 
Chancery court, register sale, new owner J J J - - 
Vacancy intake, inspection, maint. 
registry  J J J J J 
Serve notice to secure  - J J J J 
Boarding, lien issuance  - J - - - 
Prepare/hold administrative hearing - J - - - 
Police call   - - J J J 
Demolition notices   - - J J - 
Contractor demolition, lien issued - - J J - 
Property tax loss from demolition  - - J J J 
Prepare/conduct demolition court - - - - J 
Unpaid property/utility tax losses - - - J J 
Unpaid water, mow lawn, remove trash - - - J J 
Fire suppression   - - - - J 
                  
Source: William Apgar and Mark Duda. 2004. The Municipal Impact of Today’s Mortgage 
Foreclosure Boom. Minneapolis, MN: Homeownership Preservation Foundation. 
Analysis for the City of Chicago.  





Why do foreclosures cause local governments to spend more? In a study of the City of 
Chicago, William Apgar and Mark Duda enumerated the reasons.44 They estimate the 
costs (as of 2005) of actions that the city must take under five different scenarios 
(summarized in figure 2). In scenario A, the property is vacant but secured by its owner. 
Only a few administrative processing tasks are required ($430). Where the current 
owner has not secured the property, the city has to step in and take action itself. If the 
decision is to secure and conserve the property (scenario B) the costs of required 
processing jump up to $5,400, but if the decision is to demolish (scenario C), they go up 
even higher to over $13,000. If the owner abandons the property (scenario D) the city’s 
financial exposure is even steeper because of unpaid property and utility taxes, and new 
outlays to continue water service and provide lawn mowing and trash removal (almost 
$20,000). The city’s exposure is highest by far if a fire occurs (scenario E). In this case, 
there are the costs of fire suppression, the eventual costs of demolition and site 
clearance, and the costs of keeping the building from being a threat to safety in between 
(more than $34,000). 
 
These are direct costs related to the foreclosed property itself. If foreclosure densities go 
up, there will be additional expenses for enhanced maintenance and trash collection in 
the broader neighborhood and outlays by the police department to address increased 
vandalism and crime in the area.45 Furthermore, there will be additional costs to provide 
services to vulnerable residents who are displaced. In the NLC survey last cited, 53 
percent of the officials said that needs for temporary assistance had increased some or 
a lot over the past year. Considering the weakening revenue position of most 
municipalities in the current environment, it seems likely that many of them may have to 
respond by cutting back on services rather than expanding outlays, unless more federal 





Taken together, an individual foreclosure imposes significant costs on a number of 
different parties. Figure 3, taken from a report prepared for the U.S. Senate Joint 
Economic Committee, attempts a summary of these costs. 
 
First, there is a typical $7,200 cost to the homeowner, a figure not including any imputed 
values for the effects of stress on the family. Second, as noted earlier, are the high legal 
and administrative costs born by the lender/servicer: as much as $50,000. Next are the 
costs to local government: $19,229 under scenario D from Apgar and Duda’s analysis 
explained above. Finally, there is a $3,016 drop in property value for the adjacent homes 
(calculated based on information from the Immergluck and Smith study). The estimated 
total cost is $79,443. 






THE HIGH COSTS OF FORECLOSURE 
  Est. cost/   
Stakeholder foreclosure Source/basis 
Homeowner  $7,200  Anna Moreno, "The Cost of Mortgage Foreclosure Prevention," Minneapolis Family Housing Fund, 1995. 
Lender/servicer  $50,000  Desiree Hatcher, "Foreclosure Alternatives: A Case Study for Preserving Homeownership," Profitwise News and Views, 2006. 
Local government  $19,229 
Estimate assumes property is abandoned before foreclosure 
completed. William C. Apgar and Mark Duda, "Collateral Damage: 
The Municipal Impact of Today's Foreclosure Boom," 
Homeownership Preservation Foundation, May 2005. 
Adjacent neighbors  
(home values) $3,016 
Assumes two adjacent homes each experiencing a 0.9% home-
price depreciation based on the $167,500 national 2005 median 
home price (American Community Survey). Dan Immergluck and 
Geoff Smith, "The External Costs of Foreclosure: The Impact of 
Single-Family Mortgage Foreclosures on Property Values," 
Housing Policy Debate, 17(1), 2006.    
Estimated total cost of 
a single foreclosure $79,443   
 
Source: Joint Economic Committee. 2007. Sheltering Neighborhoods from the Subprime 
Foreclosure Storm. Washington, DC: Joint Economic Committee. Special Report, April. 
 














   Section 4 




While there is little hard research on magnitudes and details, it is self-evident that 
foreclosures can have devastating, often ruinous, impacts on families (section 2). 
Impacts on neighborhoods can also be devastating, and there is more solid evidence to 
back up that claim (section 3). 
 
As the number of foreclosures accelerates in early 2009, how ready is America to 
address these impacts, and what lessons have been learned so far about how to do so 
effectively? These are the two questions that motivate this section. As noted earlier, 
much of what has to be done to address the crisis ultimately has to be implemented at 
the local level—within the nation’s metropolitan areas for the most part. Accordingly, we 
continue to regard city and metropolitan leaders and practitioners as our primary 
audience, although we recognize that a part of what local stakeholders have to do is to 
press for essential changes in state and federal policies that will enable an appropriate 
local response. 
 
A workable local foreclosure response system must develop appropriate tools and 
mobilize local institutions to do four things: 
 
• Develop a Coordinated Foreclosure Response Strategy 
• Prevent Foreclosures and Keep Families in Their Homes 
• Stabilize Neighborhoods 
• Help Families Recover 
 
In this section we discuss the kinds of work involved in each area and summarize what 
is known about the response to date, nationally and at the local level.  
 
 





Develop a Coordinated Foreclosure Response Strategy 
 
In states, cities, and suburban communities across the community, task forces and 
coalitions are forming to coordinate and improve local responses to the foreclosure 
crisis. This coordination is an essential part of the development and execution of an 
effective strategy to prevent foreclosures and stabilize communities.  
 
This section reviews the basic approaches the stakeholders are taking to develop a 
coordinated response strategy, including the following actions: 
 
• Get Organized for Foreclosure Response 
• Strengthen the State and Local Policy Environment  
• Develop a Local Action Strategy  
• Assess Progress 
 
Get Organized for Foreclosure Response. The first necessary task in getting 
organized to develop an effective foreclosure response is to identify which organizations 
are already involved in addressing various aspects of the crisis. Stakeholders will likely 
include local nonprofit community development agencies and housing counseling 
agencies, philanthropic groups, local real estate agents and developers, banks, legal-aid 
organizations, advocates, and local and state political officials.  
 
Some areas may find that the foreclosure crisis has reached the point where local 
stakeholders are eager to engage with each other, but in other areas groups may need 
to publicize the crisis and educate public and private actors about why they should be 
concerned with and involved in a coordinated foreclosure response strategy.  
 
Getting Organized at the State Level. Since many of the laws and regulation that will 
determine the effectiveness of foreclosure response occur at the state level, it is 
important that priority be given to organizing at that level. So far, this need has been 
addressed in a number of states by establishing a foreclosure response task force. 
 
Creating a broad-reaching task force can help ensure that all facets of a state’s 
approach to addressing the foreclosure crisis are woven together into a comprehensive 
foreclosure plan. So that communities’ solutions can be both quick and comprehensive, 
the recommendations of a task force can be implemented on a rolling basis. According 
to a study released in April 2008 by the Pew Center on the States, 14 states have 
created foreclosure task forces.46  
 
Foreclosure task forces should have a diverse membership, including government 
officials, community-based nonprofits, real estate agents, financial institutions, attorneys, 





developers, and business leaders. Increased awareness of and attention to foreclosure 
issues may be an immediate benefit of creating a task force, while stronger foreclosure 
prevention and mitigation policies and assistance for struggling homeowners and 
neighborhoods tend to follow as a task force’s plans are devised and implemented. 
 
Getting Organized at the Local and Regional Levels. At the local level, the first priority is 
to mobilize foreclosure response teams within local governments, since they 
(municipalities and counties) have the legal power and the responsibility for many of the 
requisite actions (particularly with respect to neighborhood stabilization—securing 
properties and bringing them back into use). Governments at this level had the 
responsibility for preparing the Neighborhood Stabilization Plans called for under the 
Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008 (HERA). The first step is to establish a 
cross-departmental team or task force, probably under the aegis of a deputy mayor or 
other official with enough power to assure coordination across disparate agencies. 
Important here too is involving local community development corporations and other 
nonprofit housing and community development advocates in the planning process so 
they will be prepared to play much-needed roles in implementation. 
 
Interestingly, there also is a growing recognition of the need for new or stronger 
mechanisms at the metropolitan level; such efforts would examine how the nature of the 
problem varies across neighborhoods metro wide, develop a foreclosure response 
strategy (offering guidance on where and how to target resources), mobilize local 
interest and participation, press higher levels of government to support needed reforms, 
and track the performance of all groups working on the issue. These functions fill a real 
gap. Individual jurisdictions may face difficulties performing these functions because they 
cannot take advantage of economies of scale in mobilizing and coordinating the 
deployment of nonprofit resources. State governments cannot take them on because 
they are too removed from the local scene and may not be accepted as truly 
representing the metropolis at hand. 
 
There is only a small collection of stories to go by, but it appears that a growing number 
of metropolitan areas are now trying to strengthen their coordination of foreclosure 
response activities. There is no single right answer to the question of how local 
practitioners, advocates, and policymakers should structure and govern their regional 
collaborations. Instead, a variety of institutional forms are emerging.  
 
In Baltimore, for example, several local counseling and advocacy groups came together 
to form the Baltimore Homeownership Preservation Coalition (BHPC), which has since 
become the “central place” where those working on the issue in the area meet to try to 
track the problem and discuss ideas for response.47 BHPC now has 58 member 
organizations, which include government agencies and legal services and community 





development groups as well as counseling organizations. While focusing on the city, the 
coalition has been reaching out to work with metro and state actors as well.  
 
In Atlanta, the Atlanta Regional Commission (ARC, in effect, the region’s council of 
governments) has taken the lead in analyzing information about how the incidence of 
foreclosure filings varies across the region. ARC is now working with the city, individual 
county governments, universities, and other local nongovernmental partners on the 
development of strategies to expand foreclosure prevention and stabilize impacted 
neighborhoods. 48  
 
In many other regions, the existing council of governments or metropolitan planning 
organization may be best positioned to exert leadership on this issue and stimulate the 
creation of coalitions of interested stakeholders (like the BHPC) and of rich partnering 
relationships with individual local governments. Alternatively, a nongovernmental 
coalition might form first, as it did in Baltimore, and then play the central role in engaging 
the council of governments and other local players. 
 
Once organizations are engaged on the issue, they will likely take on different roles in 
the coalition. The Memphis coalition, for example, has three subgroups: a working 
group, a resource group, and a leadership group. 
 
 Working group. This group consists of the local community development 
councils, legal services, and other leading nonprofit agencies, together with data 
support provided by the Center for Community Building and Neighborhood Action 
(based at the University of Memphis). The working group does most of the 
planning and implementation work of the coalition. 
 
 Resource group. This group is made up of organizations and local agencies that 
can provide specialized resources for the working group, such as housing 
counseling or code-enforcement strategies. 
 
 Leadership group. This last group is made of up community leaders, including 
city and county officials and local foundations. While this group may not 
participate in the day-to-day work of the coalition, the success of the coalition’s 
strategy depends on getting their input and buy-in. 
 
Strengthen the State and Local Policy Environment. Once coalitions evolve at the 
state, regional, and local levels, they should be well positioned to advocate for more 
effective tools and resources from the federal government. However, as noted, many of 
the needed policy changes and other necessary actions have to occur at the state level. 
It is the state that typically controls many of the most relevant legal, regulatory, and 





budgetary levers, and local coalitions need their states to deliver in order to be effective. 
Alan Mallach has developed a full menu of what states can do in this regard:49 
 
 revising laws and regulations to ensure a fair foreclosure process, prevent 
predatory and deceptive foreclosure “rescue” schemes, move properties into 
reuse more rapidly, and support the creation of entities that can ensure 
foreclosed properties will be conveyed to responsible owners; 
 
 using their leverage to encourage creditors to pursue alternatives to foreclosure 
where possible and, when foreclosure does occur, to recognize their obligations 
to keep properties well maintained while they are in REO status; and 
 
 providing more funding and other supports for local counseling and neighborhood 
stabilization activities. 
 
This component of the work also includes better informing local governments about the 
evolving nature of the foreclosure crisis, promising responses, and then taking steps as 
needed to encourage revising local laws, regulations, and policies to be more conducive 
to realistic solutions. Relevant policies controlled by cities and counties include eviction 
protection for renters, definitions and enforcement of property code violations, and 
differential tax treatment for vacant properties. 
 
Develop a Local Action Strategy. The main components of a foreclosure response 
strategy will include preventing foreclosures, addressing neighborhood spillover effects, 
and helping families recover. But assigning priorities is no easy task. Section 3 showed 
that the nature and extent of foreclosure problems differ dramatically across 
neighborhoods in most metropolitan areas. Some neighborhoods warrant higher priority 
than others, and solutions that work well in one may not prove effective in others. 
 
It is apparent, therefore, that devising strategies to respond to the foreclosure crisis 
depends more on good data than on efforts to address many other issues. Local 
coalitions should strive to assemble and evaluate pertinent data at the neighborhood 
level and to use that data to develop strategic guidance for policy change, targeting 
specific types of mitigation actions to different types of neighborhoods. 
 
Needed data include neighborhood-level information on the numbers of loans and 
foreclosures but also on a host of other social, economic, and physical characteristics 
that allow analysts to better interpret the implications of any particular risk of foreclosure. 
The good news is that the cost of assembling such data from local records has dropped 
dramatically in recent years. University institutes and civic groups in a sizeable number 
of metro areas have already obtained, and are using, much of the data that are needed. 





A rapidly growing network of such organizations in 31 cities—the National Neighborhood 
Indicators Partnership (NNIP)—works to advance techniques in this field and spread 
capacity to other cities.50 
 
But even groups that do not have access to local foreclosure data can get started using 
nationally available data to begin to understand how the foreclosure problem is playing 
out in different neighborhoods. Access to such data can be obtained, for example, at 
http://www.Foreclosure-Response.org. 
 
Local analysts may ultimately develop sophisticated analyses of available data as they 
work with policymakers and practitioners to craft sensible interventions in different 
neighborhoods. It may make sense, however, to start with a fairly straightforward 
framework that classifies neighborhoods by housing market strength and the risk of 
being impacted by foreclosures, consistent with themes suggested by Alan Mallach.51 
Figure 4 is an example of such a framework: 
 
• the rows classify market strength as (1) strong, (2) intermediate, or (3) weak, and 
 
• the columns classify the foreclosure impact risk as (A) low risk of a high 
concentration of foreclosures (high foreclosure density), (B) high risk of high 
foreclosure density, or (C) actual high foreclosure density. 
 
This type of framework could help communities tailor strategies and make informed 
choices about how to target scarce resources. The central goals are to prevent 
foreclosures from destabilizing sound neighborhoods and to revive those already in 
decline. In a resource-scarce environment, this means investing time and resources in 
those neighborhoods where the investments will have the most significant payoff. At the 
simplest level, planners might apply guidelines like the following: 






FORECLOSURE RESPONSE STRATEGY FRAMEWORK 
  Foreclosure Impact Risk 
Market A. Low risk of high B. High risk of high C. Actual high 
strength foreclosure density foreclosure density  foreclosure density  
    
1. Strong Lower priority Lower cost effort to Facilitate rapid sales to  
  prevent foreclosures and sustainable owners, rehabs 
  vacancies, low/no subsidy  as needed, low/no subsidy 
    
    
2. Inter- Lower priority but Highest payoff/priority, 2nd highest payoff/priority, 
mediate watch carefully, head off prevent foreclosures and rehab & rapid sale to 
 emerging problems early vacancies, emphasize  sustainable owners, target 
  neighborhood maintenance subsidies, neigh. maint. 
    
    
3. Weak Lower priority but Lower cost effort to More emphasis securing/ 
 watch carefully, head off prevent foreclosures and demolishing, land banking 
 emerging problems early vacancies, low/no subsidy  to hold until market rebound 
        
 
1. Local strategies probably do not need to invest much in the way of foreclosure-
response resources in neighborhoods where there is a low risk of many 
foreclosures, regardless of market strength (see 1A, 2A, or 3A in figure 4), 
although trends should be monitored so that low-cost interventions could be 
mounted in intermediate- and weak-market neighborhoods to head off problems 
quickly if risks start to increase. 
 
2. Strong-market neighborhoods are not likely to demand much attention until risks 
of foreclosure impacts increase substantially (1B and 1C). There are not likely to 
be many neighborhoods in these categories but when they emerge, cities should 
act quickly to prevent actual foreclosures and minimize vacancy in any properties 
where foreclosures do occur. With prompt intervention to do that, the strength of 
the market may prevent serious further slippage, so less subsidy is likely to be 
needed than in areas where the market is weaker. 
 
3. Markets where there is an intermediate level of demand may be the highest-
priority targets for government investment, since they are close to a tipping 
point—susceptible to rapid decline if foreclosures are not prevented or the 
properties are not swiftly brought back into reuse. Where many properties are at 
risk but foreclosures have not yet occurred (2B), the emphasis should be on 
prevention: outreach and counseling for troubled borrowers and help (sometimes 
financial) so they can refinance on terms that will be sustainable. Also needed in 





these areas will be code enforcement and public maintenance to “keep up 
appearances” in properties and public spaces not yet directly threatened.  
 
4. Intervention in intermediate markets where a sizeable number of foreclosures 
have already occurred (2C) is also likely to be urgent. Officials should continue 
all of the types of actions suggested for 2B above, but also add forceful direct 
public action to restore foreclosed properties to use as soon as possible. 
Rehabilitation may be needed, and subsidies are likely to be appropriate in many 
cases. Rehabilitation will only be warranted, however, where the market is strong 
enough so that the new owners (investors or owner-occupants), taking into 
account the full costs of rehab as well as available subsidies, will subsequently 
be able to operate the property in an economically stable manner over the long 
term. Public acquisition and transfer of ownership to nonprofit housing groups 
may be appropriate for some properties. 
 
5. Neighborhoods with both a weak market demand for housing and high risk of 
foreclosure impacts (3B and 3C) represent an even more difficult challenge. In 
some places, sizeable, strategically placed public investments can turn market 
conditions around. Generally, however, funds are not likely to be adequate to 
recreate a stable private market everywhere. Where this is so, research has 
shown that revitalization funds will have more impact if clustered in a few 
locations rather than spread evenly in all distressed neighborhoods.52 In 
remaining areas where the market is likely to remain weak for some time, it may 
be difficult to justify investments in rehabilitation because the prices or rents 
needed to cover the costs will exceed what people are willing to pay. With 
investments in renovations that are not targeted, communities may find they 
quickly run through available funds and in the end do not have enough to 
successfully stabilize these neighborhoods. In a worst-case scenario, much of 
the available funding could ultimately be lost. 
 
An alternative approach would be for government to acquire the foreclosed 
properties, demolish the structures, and hold the parcels as a part of a land bank 
until market conditions rebound enough to justify further investment. This is, of 
course, a difficult decision to make, and significant discussion will be needed with 
many constituencies to reach a level of community acceptance that will allow this 
strategy to move forward successfully. 
 
Real neighborhoods, of course, may not fall neatly into just one of these boxes. When a 
neighborhood fits between two of them, a blending of the actions suggested for the two 
will be appropriate. 
 





Also, even though market conditions and concentration of foreclosures are the most 
important indicators for these purposes, other information should be consulted as well in 
developing an action strategy. One additional factor to consider is the extent of other 
investment—both past and present—by the private or public sectors. Some 
neighborhoods may already have had substantial private or public sector investment, in 
which case no additional funding may be needed. On the other hand, these areas might 
require new funding to protect the long-term investments that have been made and 
prevent the neighborhoods from sliding into decline. Other neighborhoods may have 
community resources and assets, including anchor institutions or strong community 
groups that will be able to leverage new public investments to stabilize the 
neighborhood, even if the housing market data indicate a weaker market. Additionally, 
certain neighborhoods may have a greater capacity to influence the trajectory of areas 
that surround them; any funds targeted to these areas would have a higher impact than 
funds targeted to a neighborhood that is more economically and socially isolated. 
 
A good example of a strategic planning effort that followed this “different treatments for 
different types of neighborhoods” approach is one developed in Columbus County and 
Franklin County, Ohio, with technical support provided by Community Research 
Partners, the local NNIP affiliate. This effort explicitly sought to “(1) prevent 
neighborhood decline associated with foreclosure in traditionally stable markets…; (2) 
address the issue of backslide due to foreclosure in ‘tipping point’ neighborhoods; and 
(3) focus resources in neighborhoods traditionally targeted by revitalization efforts, 
preventing further disinvestment and decline.” “Weak-market” neighborhoods were 
identified and “comprehensive acquisition and holding plans” were devised for each.53 
 
Finally, while addressing the current foreclosure issue is the highest priority, local 
coalitions also may want to be on the lookout for opportunities to use this immediate 
crisis to further broaden housing policy goals, such as increasing the supply of 
affordable rental housing, promoting mixed-income neighborhoods, developing 
homeownership opportunities for the local workforce, and increasing green space.  
 
Assess Progress. There is a growing expectation that publicly supported initiatives 
should be held accountable for results. This means that responsible entities should 
prepare regular “report cards” on the nature and scope of the problem they are dealing 
with and on the success of local efforts to address it. With respect to the foreclosure 
crisis, we know of no local government that is doing that as yet, presumably because it 
has been particularly difficult to assemble the relevant data.  
 
However, the future for such reporting is starting to look promising. A number of cities 
now have potentially linkable automated records on foreclosure notices, and transfers of 





monthly or quarterly title reports on several aspects of the problem could be produced 
for the city or county and for individual neighborhoods: 
 
• number of properties entering the foreclosure pipeline (notices), 
• disposition of properties in the pipeline (foreclosure cancelled or title transferred 
after sheriff’s sale), and 
• number of REO properties subsequently sold to a new owner (by months since a 
sheriff’s sale). 
 
Information along these lines is now available in a number of cities, including Baltimore, 
Cleveland, Memphis, and Washington, D.C. Some have done sophisticated analyses of 
the results of the process. One report available in Cleveland, for example, allows 
assessments of the probabilities of foreclosure given varying characteristics of the loan. 
Another report using the Cleveland data system analyzes how long institutional investors 
are holding properties after foreclosure and the prices at which properties are ultimately 
sold.54  
 
Other elements needed for performance reporting on this topic relate to data on program 
activities, and data collection here is also getting easier. For actions taken by the local 
government on specific foreclosed properties (e.g., demolition, boarding up, 
rehabilitation) the need is to link a description of what was done (type of action, dates, 
and dollar amounts) to the address and track other indicators of neighborhood change. It 
will then be possible to conduct analysis and assess performance for individual 
neighborhoods as well as the jurisdiction as a whole. 
 
The hardest part of program reporting in this field is assembling data from the many 
nonprofit counselors and advocacy groups involved. However, there seems to be a 
growing interest in doing this too, because counselors are feeling a need for data on 
“who else is doing what and how much” so they can target their own activities efficiently. 
This topic (how to get coordinated reports on counseling activity) is now being seriously 
considered, for example, by the Baltimore Homeownership Preservation Coalition. 
 
 
Prevent Foreclosures and Keep Families in Their Homes 
 
This work entails counseling owners to help them keep up to date on their mortgage 
payments. Where that fails, counselors can attempt to help owners and their loan 
servicers work out modifications to the terms of the loans, making them sufficiently 
affordable over the long term so that foreclosure can be averted. Where that fails as 
well, the work may also entail devising arrangements to allow the former residents 





(owners or renters) to remain in the property as renters, possibly under a plan that might 
restore some to ownership at some point. 
 
There is ample guidance available on approaches to homeownership counseling and 
loan modification.55 An effective foreclosure prevention system should include the 
following elements: 
 
• A substantial program of ongoing outreach to inform at-risk owners of their rights, 
encourage them to contact responsible counseling organizations, and avoid 
being taken in by unscrupulous parties offering to provide assistance. A 
coordinated outreach program involving local government agencies as well as 
nonprofit counselors and coordinating groups should be the goal. These efforts 
should be proactive in terms of use of all media to get their message across. 
Many establish a 24-hour hotline and a one-stop foreclosure prevention service.  
• The development of a sizeable number of competent nonprofit counseling 
organizations that have established working relationships with servicers and 
lenders as well as relevant government agencies. An efficient computer-based 
system is important for all to maintain adequate records on clients, loans, and 
events in the process.56 
• Access to resources that allows organizations to provide financial assistance to 
help their clients overcome short-term emergencies and enhance the feasibility of 
alternative refinancing plans in working out loan modifications with servicers. 
• Appropriate legal assistance to assure adequate representation of clients in loan 
modification and in other issues that could arise in the foreclosure process. The 
state of Ohio and its bar association for example, have made aggressive efforts 
to mobilize attorneys to assist struggling homeowners in the foreclosure process. 
Many have registered on a voluntary basis.  
 
The task of loan modification is the most challenging. If the principal balance of the loan 
is not written down or the interest rate reduced (either through the injection of subsidy 
funds or the lender writing off some amount), all that can be done to make payments 
more affordable is to adjust the terms (e.g., reduce the monthly amount but extend the 
period of payment). This is often not enough to make the revised loan sustainable.  
 
If the loan cannot be modified satisfactorily, there is an alternative that, while far from 
ideal, is generally a better resolution to the issue than foreclosure: helping the borrower 
negotiate a short sale. This is where the lender agrees to allow sale for less than the full 
outstanding balance of the mortgage and, in return for that amount, to eliminate the debt. 
The borrowers benefit—while they lose their homes and damage their credit histories to 
some extent, they walk away debt free—and the lenders gain a sizeable payment early 





and avoid what we have seen can be a considerable additional expense in following 
through on the foreclosure process.57 
 
Sizeable national efforts have been mounted to expand counseling in the current crisis. 
The federal government provided funding to NeighborWorks America (NW) to create and 
lead a consortium of banks and other groups called the Hope Now Alliance; the 
consortium facilitates voluntary loan modifications and provides additional counseling 
through its $180 million National Foreclosure Mitigation Counseling Program.58 In both 
cases, the work is actually carried out by hundreds of local counseling and advocacy 
groups (many affiliated with the existing NW network) that already exist in most 
metropolitan areas. In addition, HERA (H.R. 3221 enacted in July 2008) created a 
broader HOPE for Homeowners program in the Federal Housing Administration (FHA) 
that supports refinancing loans for borrowers in or at risk of default at better terms.59. 
 
However, through early 2009, the lenders had been generally unwilling to write down 
principal or reduce interest rates voluntarily, and the federal government had not come 
up with incentives and supports that caused them to do so. Accordingly, results have 
been modest. The comptroller of the currency recently reported that more than half of 
the owners whose mortgages were modified in hope of stability during the first half of 
2008 ended up in default again within six months.60 Furthermore, the Department of 
Housing and Urban Development’s (HUD’s) new HOPE for Homeowners program, 
which was supposed to help 400,000 owners avoid foreclosure, has had negligible 
participation to this point. According to HUD’s secretary, this has been due to high cost 
and onerous requirements.61  
 
There remains debate as to which cases warrant government subsidy and how much 
should be provided. Some have argued that the owners now in default on a loan they 
cannot afford “should have known better,” but many recognize that very large numbers 
were induced to take on their current loans by predatory brokers and did not fully 
understand what they were getting into. There seems general agreement that 
government funds should not be used to (1) bail out owners that have the means to 
sustain a loan on their own with modest adjustments to the terms, or (2) keep owners in 
homes that they realistically cannot afford over the long term (although many of these 
will need other types of support in the transition). Subsidies to make ongoing ownership 
workable should be targeted to those in between. 
 
Even where there is agreement that a borrower should be helped, however, questions 
remain in many cases as to the best way to do it. One study by the National Low Income 
Housing Coalition, for example, suggests that while subsidies may be warranted in many 
cities, fully bailing out the loans may not make sense in formerly hot markets like Los 
Angeles or Boston—cities where the cost of home ownership may be “two to three times 





that of renting a comparable unit.” Sustaining borrowers in their current units in these 
circumstances may be much too wasteful of subsidy funds—the same amount of 
subsidy in other markets could help a number of families.62 
 
In February 2009, the Obama administration announced an extensive ($75 billion) new 
national program to prevent foreclosures (the Homeowner Affordability and Stability 
Plan). It intends to assist as many as 7 to 9 million homeowners but, as of this writing, 





Neighborhood stabilization programs aim to mitigate the deleterious community impacts 
of foreclosures enumerated earlier and restore healthy market conditions. As stressed in 
section 3, some of the most negative impacts on neighborhoods are created by the 
vacancies (and sometimes abandonments) that result from foreclosure. The goal of 
programs to mitigate neighborhood impacts, therefore, emphasizes minimizing 
vacancies and their effects.63 There are several possible courses of action. 
 
Secure and Maintain Vacant Properties. This entails rapid action by local 
governments to assure that vacant properties are properly secured and then to find 
some way to arrange for adequate ongoing maintenance.64 This starts with pressures to 
get the banks that now own many vacant properties (now REOs) to perform these 
functions. This can happen through (1) setting differential property tax rates;65 (2) 
requiring owners of vacant properties to register them and pay an associated fee; (3) 
placing a lien on a vacant property, justified by the additional costs incurred due to the 
vacancy; and (4) providing financial incentives for the servicer to maintain and improve a 
vacant property (e.g., grants and below-market loans, tax abatements, forgiveness of 
liens).  
 
If these approaches fail, nuisance abatement provisions in state laws usually allow 
municipalities to act directly to secure these properties and keep them well maintained. 
This can include government employees (or their contractors) mowing lawns, removing 
trash, making various repairs, boarding up buildings, and even demolishing buildings.  
 
As the number of foreclosures mounts in any area, neighborhood-wide code 
enforcement will have to be intensified and general public maintenance and repair efforts 
enhanced to do a better job of keeping up the appearances of the neighborhood’s 
buildings and public spaces. The municipality may also want to engage the residents in 
fix-up and improvement campaigns. 
 





Expedite Private Resale of the Property. The above efforts are only buying time, 
however. Agencies must move to the second step as soon as possible. Where market 
conditions are strong enough to allow it (refer to the strategy matrix in figure 4), the 
starting point should be to encourage responsible private parties (investors or 
prospective owner-occupants) to purchase the property (and, in many cases, rehabilitate 
it) and then expedite reoccupancy. State and local governments can play a role in this. 
First, they can put pressure on REO owners to move quickly in a number of ways. One 
may be to institute a legal requirement that creditors who initiate the foreclosure process 
move forward within specified time periods or relinquish the right to foreclose. Second, 
they can make doing so more attractive for REO owners, for example, by streamlining 
processing, helping in marketing, and, in some cases, providing financial incentives. 
 
Public Acquisition and Management. Alternatively, where market conditions are at 
weak to intermediate levels, it may be necessary for government agencies to play the 
central role in acquiring foreclosed properties and getting them back into use. Local 
governments should make a clear assignment of the agency to be responsible for this 
role and most need to make a serious effort to expand staff capacity. Staff should be 
able to enter into tough negotiations with REO owners (many of whom have not 
adequately acknowledged how the values of their properties have declined). There may 
be need for new state legislation that penalizes REO owners who turn down responsible 
offers by government but later sell the property for a lower price.  
 
It may be advantageous to try to negotiate bulk purchases with larger REO owners 
rather than on a property-by-property basis. Local governments should also be 
aggressive about acquiring properties at low cost through tax foreclosure when the 
circumstances warrant. They should also be alert to other opportunities to reduce public 
acquisition costs. FHA’s 602 Nonprofit Disposition Program, for example, allows local 
governments and nonprofits in specified asset control areas to purchase foreclosed FHA 
properties at substantial discounts.66 
 
A problem is that in many communities, there is no public or quasi-public entity that has 
the capacity (or in some cases, the appropriate legal authority) to handle the acquisition, 
management, and disposition of property in the public interest in an effective manner. 
Specialized agencies may have to be created (or strengthened) to perform this “land-
banking” function at scale67 (one of the most successful land bank examples is that 
implemented in Genesee County, Michigan).68  
 
When public agencies (land banks or otherwise) have acquired foreclosed properties, 
they must make sensible decisions about the future of each one consistent with market 
realities (again see the framework in figure 4 and more detailed guidance offered by 
Alan Mallach and the Furman Center at New York University).69 One option is to 





rehabilitate the property and then market it to a private buyer. Another is to convey the 
property to a nonprofit housing group to both implement the rehab and then manage the 
property as affordable rental housing over the long term. Alternatively, a community 
land-trust model may make sense (where families can purchase a unit at a below-market 
price but the community trust retains ownership of the land, and the unit owners and the 
trust typically share profits from appreciation at resale).70  
 
The decision to rehab the property and try to bring it back into use, however, must be 
carefully considered. Even with a reasonable amount of subsidy the market in the 
neighborhood (either for rentals or homeownership) may not be strong enough to make 
doing so feasible in the short term. If so, the only reasonable course of action may be to 
board up or demolish the structures and then hold the land for a fairly prolonged period 
until the market improves again. After demolition, in an effort to reduce maintenance 
costs, the practical thing is sometimes to provide planting and convert the land into 
public park space. Another approach (where feasible) is to convey the land to abutting 
owners so that they have more expansive side lots, eliminating the need for ongoing 
public outlays altogether.  
 
Federal Support: the Neighborhood Stabilization Program. There is hardly any 
documentation on what stabilization actions like these had been implemented before 
HERA became law.71 However, in addition to the mortgage-modification effort discussed 
above, HERA also created the Neighborhood Stabilization Program (NSP), which 
provided $3.9 billion to be allocated by formula to states and localities to support just the 
kinds of efforts to mitigate neighborhood impacts discussed above.72 HUD implemented 
the allocation formula expeditiously, promulgating it and related regulations on 
September 27, 2008. Jurisdictions receiving allocations had to complete their action 
plans by December 1. They are scheduled to receive their allocations by the end of the 
first quarter of 2009 and will be obligated to use all funds within 18 months of their 
receipt. 
 
While the original NSP was important, observers generally considered it problematic in 
two respects. First, given the haste with which funds must be spent, there are doubts 
that many jurisdictions will be able to spend them wisely. Section 3 emphasized that the 
extent and nature of the foreclosure problem varies significantly across neighborhoods in 
most metro areas. There is the concern that most local governments do not have the 
skills to target actions sensitively in relation to market differences, and many may not 
have the administrative capacities needed to implement these kinds of programs 
effectively once targets have been set.  
 
Second, although no one has yet made a supportable estimate of the total amount of 
public funds needed to address neighborhood impact mitigation, advocates have 





generally considered the initial $3.9 billion to be woefully inadequate. This has been 
addressed at least partially in the Obama administration’s economic recovery package 
by the provision of an additional $2 billion for NSP (H.R. 1, the American Economic 
Recovery and Reinvestment Act, passed in February 2009). Unlike the existing program, 
the new NSP allocation is to be allocated via a competitive process. Nonprofits, as well 
as states and local governments, will be eligible to submit proposals. 
 
 
Help Families Recover 
 
What local actions are needed to mitigate the deleterious impacts of the foreclosure 
crisis on families, as itemized in section 2? The enhanced availability of many types of 
services is foremost.  
 
Some of the former owners who have lost their homes via foreclosure may still have 
income and be relatively stable in other ways. Still, as the discussion of the trauma of 
foreclosure in section 2 implies, many of them may well develop needs for more 
intensive services. And certainly many displaced renters are likely to require more.  
 
Emergency Housing Assistance. For renters and the most troubled former owners, the 
foreclosure-related displacement may simply be one of a series of disturbing events that 
face the nation’s most vulnerable families (e.g., illness, job loss, family stress). They are 
likely to require the full array of services that are in some places now being thought of 
and planned collectively under the rubric of homelessness prevention.73  
 
This is likely to start with emergency housing assistance (financial and other) to help 
them secure and be able to pay for a new place to live. There may be needs for 
additional in-kind assistance (food and clothing) as well. Over the past decade, 
assistance in finding a new place to live in these circumstances has improved under 
many local continuum of care programs.74 The level of information about such 
assistance has also increased in most areas.75  
 
An important opportunity at this point is to make sure that housing counseling agencies 
advising families in the foreclosure process are aware of the types of assistance that are 
available and are providing relevant information to their clients. Several new programs 
are targeting resources specifically to families displaced by foreclosure. The State of 
Massachusetts, for example, now requires participating lenders to provide $5,000 to 
housing counseling agencies for each of their borrowers being served. These funds 
cover the costs of moving and security deposits for the families, with the provision that 
any leftover amounts go back to the counseling agency. 
 





A Wider Range of Social Services. For a sizeable number, there will be requirements 
for counseling and advocacy that will help them connect with other resources to stabilize 
their lives over the longer term:  
 
• counseling on family financial management and, for some, help preparing for and 
finding new jobs; 
• legal assistance with housing and other issues;  
• special programs in the schools to help the children of displaced families cope 
with the transitions; and finally,  
• services to deal with more severe issues like mental health problems, spousal 
abuse, and drug addiction that may have been exacerbated by the displacement. 
 
In these areas, America does not need new types of services to address the impacts of 
the foreclosure crisis on families but, rather, an expansion—in many areas, a significant 
expansion—and improvement in effectiveness of the types of social services that 
already exist at some level in most of our metropolitan areas.76 A step in this direction 
was taken with the passage of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act, which 
provides a new $1.5 billion homelessness prevention fund that can be used to cover 
many of these services, targeted to people who would be homeless but for this 
assistance. 
 
Repairing Credit Histories. A service that is particular to this crisis, however, is helping 
former owners who have been foreclosed upon develop and stick to realistic plans for 
repairing their credit histories over time. Even displaced families from previously higher-
income groups are likely to need this type of assistance, since the task is both 
challenging and new to them. Guidance on how to provide such counseling is now 
widely available,77 and there is growing evidence that such counseling can be effective. 
One study, by the Indianapolis Housing Partnership, found that families’ credit scores 
were significantly improved by their counseling program, helping improve the families’ 
borrowing power by an average of more than $4,500.78  
 













    Section 5 
    PRIORITIES FOR FURTHER RESEARCH  




The foreclosure crisis is center stage among America’s policy concerns in early 2009. It 
is having marked impacts on families and neighborhoods across the country and yet its 
effects, and efforts to address it, have not been the subject of considerable rigorous 
research to this point. A number of excellent studies have been completed (noted 
throughout this report). But in many ways, they have only scratched the surface. 
 
Part of the reason is that the crisis has emerged so recently that scholars have not had 
time to design and implement well-structured studies. A possibly more important reason, 
however, is that in several respects this crisis is an extraordinarily difficult phenomenon 
to research. As noted in section 1, efforts to document the impacts on families are 
frustrated by the families affected being extremely hard to identify and track. Foreclosure 
has caused them to move, and there is no easy way to find them again.  
 
With recent advances in the development of local parcel-based data systems, research 
on neighborhood effects should be easier than it has been in the past. But the problem 
in this case is that results are likely to vary in different kinds of metropolitan areas and 
different kinds of neighborhoods within them. Good studies will demand a considerable 
amount of contextual data as well as data on the foreclosed properties themselves. The 
same problem affects the research on the efficacy of interventions—even more so. 
Researchers need definite time- and property-specific facts about often-complex 
programmatic actions on top of data about the properties themselves and their contexts. 
 
What follows is a brief listing of ideas about research opportunities in each of these 
categories related to secondary effects. The list is far from exhaustive in these 
categories (they deal only with what we see as the priorities at this point) and they do not 
cover other key topics in the broader field (e.g., foreclosure prevention, revising the 





regulatory environment). We conclude, however, with another topic that may be even 
more important than the research: the need for improvements to data systems at all 
levels to support more effective planning and promote accountability. 
 
 
Research on Impacts on Families  
 
After so many stories about victims of the foreclosure crisis have appeared in the press 
over the past two years, the public does not seem to need much more convincing that 
the problems are serious. Still, all of the anecdotes do not add up to a balanced 
understanding of the impacts and how they occur. We still do not have “numbers” on the 
incidence of all of the potential effects we raised questions about in section 1. We know 
very little about how these effects overlap or how incidence varies for different types of 
families and locations. We think that two types of studies are warranted at this point. 
  
Comprehensive Study of Impacts on Families. Normally, when social scientists want 
to learn how a problem is affecting a population, they find a list of the people affected, 
draw a sample, and conduct interviews. Here, as noted, the problem is finding the list. 
From commercial or local sources in most cities, it is now possible to get a list of 
addresses of the properties where foreclosure sales have occurred, but not a list of the 
families that used to live there at the time those sales occurred. 
 
To our knowledge, there is only one viable approach to developing a sample survey of 
all families affected by foreclosure: one designed by Claudia Coulton of Case Western 
Reserve University.79 The steps are as follows:  
 
• Acquire a list of properties that just recently entered the foreclosure process in a 
city (i.e., notice of foreclosure has been sent but sheriff’s sale has not yet 
occurred).  
• Select a sample from that list and recruit families in a short time to form a panel. 
• Conduct multiple interviews with all families on the panel, one before foreclosure 
and two or more after (setting up procedures as needed to track them after they 
move). 
 
Coulton suggests that the surveys would cover changes in “living arrangements, 
neighborhood quality, family economic status, employment, material hardships, physical 
and mental health, [and] children’s schooling and activities.” She further writes, 
“Historical data will also be collected on how the household came to be in the foreclosed 
property. For renters, the survey will cover leasing arrangements and rental history.”  
 





To be satisfying, this study should be conducted in several cities with contrasting market 
environments. The approach has been proposed to several foundations but, as of this 
writing, it has not yet been funded. 
 
Study of Impacts on Subgroups. Another, less-comprehensive, approach would be to 
match a list of addresses of foreclosed properties after the fact with administrative 
records on a subpopulation, with residential addresses over time linked by unique 
identifiers (i.e., so one could identify many of the families that lived in each foreclosure 
just before the sale). With these matches, it should be possible to find the families at 
their current addresses and either interview them or track subsequent events that 
happen to them in the relevant administrative files. 
 
A version of this approach—involving public school children—has been funded by the 
Open Society Institute and Fannie Mae and is being implemented by the Urban Institute 
and local research organizations in Baltimore, New York, and Washington, D.C. 
Automated school records in these cities from different points in time record residential 
addresses for students, and a match with foreclosed properties controlling for the time of 
foreclosure is possible. This study plans not to interview the families of the matched 
students, but, rather, to track what happens to them in the school records at multiple 
points in time after the foreclosure (e.g., changes in reading and math proficiency, 
subsequent residential mobility, changes in rates of absence). 
 
This approach will not lead to the identification of all families affected for any time period, 
but it is likely to identify large numbers of them and it gets at some of the most critical 
impacts of interest for policy. It is also much cheaper than the comprehensive interview 
approach so it should be possible, as well as valuable, to implement it in a larger number 
of cities. 
 
This approach could be applied to other vulnerable populations for which some address-
based administrative records exist. 
 
 
Research on Impacts on Neighborhoods 
 
Past research on neighborhood impacts reviewed in section 3 has been important in 
demonstrating the critical nature of the issue: that foreclosures do indeed cause serious 
problems for communities. But, among other things, it does not say very much so far 
about how results are likely to vary in different neighborhood and metropolitan settings 
or how effects work themselves out—the sequences of effects—in any one 
neighborhood. 
 





Integrated Studies of Multiple Effects. In the studies of the relationships between 
foreclosures and property values completed so far, the magnitudes of the effects have 
differed notably in different places. There are good reasons to expect that locational 
characteristics may well cause variations in crime and other outcomes as well. This 
suggests the need for more controlled studies in a number of additional metropolitan 
areas. Fortunately, good parcel- or address-based data sets on the outcomes of interest 
are now available in a number of cities, so the potential of doing this work well at a 
reasonable cost is much better than it was even five years ago. In each study, we 
suggest the following: 
 
• Conduct analyses of the relationships between foreclosures and all indicators of 
interest simultaneously (vacancies, problem buildings, crimes of different types, 
property sales volumes, sales prices, etc.) and look for recursive relationships 
(e.g., to what extent do foreclosures lead to crime, which in turn leads to more 
foreclosures?). 
• Incorporate substantial data on the economic, social, and physical characteristics 
of neighborhoods and look explicitly for how these characteristics affect 
foreclosure impacts (areas with high foreclosure densities include outer suburban 
tracts with fairly high incomes as well as more distressed tracts in inner cities and 
inner-ring suburbs). 
• Look explicitly for nonlinear relationships (as the number of foreclosures 
increases, there may well be thresholds or tipping points beyond which negative 
impacts accelerate). 
• Look at sequences of change in relation to thresholds to see if the most 
opportune times for intervention can be identified. 
• Examine changes in characteristics of surrounding communities over the same 
time periods to learn about how and to what extent foreclosure impacts spread 
across neighborhood boundaries.  
• Use advanced econometric techniques to model temporal and spatial effects 
simultaneously (one candidate that has been suggested for such work is the 
Space Time Analysis of Regional Systems, or STARS, approach).80  
 
Further Research on Municipal Costs. Apgar and Duda’s Chicago study was valuable 
in identifying the types of added costs that municipalities could face, resulting from a 
single foreclosure. Similar studies should be conducted elsewhere (municipalities with 
different legal processes, etc.). Also, case studies of broader costs would beneficial (i.e., 
costs related to more intensified code enforcement and social services in neighborhoods 
hit hard by foreclosures). It would also be of interest to examine how local governments 
are making the tradeoff decisions about foreclosure response at present. To what extent 
are they recognizing the need for expanded services in affected neighborhoods but 
postponing the expenditure due to today’s budget problems? 







Research on Foreclosure Response to Neighborhood Impacts 
 
Research that can inform response strategy probably merits the highest priority at this 
point. One convenient way to get started would be with examination of the plans various 
jurisdictions prepared in response to HUD’s NSP grant process. There has been a 
helpful initial analysis of 87 of the plans, covering only a few descriptive characteristics, 
that provides an orientation.81 Staff of the regional banks in the Federal Reserve System 
are now planning more detailed individual case studies of a selection of these plans. 
These will contain a description of the targeting of resources, geographically and by type 
of expenditure, but they will also include analysis of how decisions were made in the 
planning process and some documentation of early implementation experiences. 
 
Preparations should be made now, however, for more comprehensive assessments of 
what cities are doing to stabilize foreclosure-impacted neighborhoods—work that 
marries the best of case study techniques with considerable quantitative analysis. Again, 
to gain an understanding of the range, these assessments should be conducted in 
several (i.e., 5–6) cities with contrasting market environments. They would cover not 
only the local NSP experience but all other elements of the city’s strategy as well.  
 
The quantitative analysis would require that agencies provide data on the actions taken 
(and associated expenditures) on a property-by-property basis (HUD is requiring that all 
grantees submit parcel-level information like this for all NSP activities). The data on 
program activity would then be related to all of the types of parcel-level information on 
changing neighborhood conditions suggested in the previous section as being needed to 
assess impacts.  
 
Systematic reviews of the descriptive statistics (program activities and neighborhood 
change) should offer a general sense of what is working, recognizing that isolating the 
effects of program actions with certainty in community development has always proven 
difficult. If the impact-assessment work suggested above yields reasonable models of 
the process in different types of neighborhoods, it might be possible to go further—
ultimately comparing real resulting neighborhood conditions to those the models predict 
would have likely occurred without the interventions.  
 
The quantitative studies in these cities should be paralleled by a thorough program of 
interviews with key informants, focus groups, and document reviews. This would support 
understanding of the planning and implementation processes, including the views and 
activities of all participants—residents as well as government and nonprofit actors.  
 






Significantly Strengthening Databases for Mortgage Market Assessment 
and Neighborhood Stabilization Planning 
 
All of this research can make important contributions to America’s ability to work its way 
out of the current foreclosure crisis effectively. But there is another set of tasks that may 
be even more important to these ends: the significant strengthening of data for use in 
mortgage market assessment and neighborhood stabilization planning. 
 
The first challenge is the creation of a national mortgage and foreclosure database. At 
present, nationwide data on these topics can only be obtained from a small number of 
fragmentary systems maintained on a proprietary basis. No one of them tells the full 
story, most have serious inadequacies, and all imply substantial costs for would-be 
users. Alan Mallach states,82 
 
a lack of even marginally accurate and complete data on the characteristics of 
mortgages, or the level and nature of foreclosure activity, poses a recurring 
challenge for policymakers…Much as it has done in areas such as health care 
and construction, the federal government should establish a national mortgage 
and foreclosure database which can provide data disaggregated to the census 
tract level…The system could be based on a simple reporting form that would be 
required at the closing or recording of each mortgage and a second set of forms 
that would be filled by the entity in each state responsible for managing the 
foreclosure process. 
 
Even if such a database existed, however, a second challenge would remain: 
strengthening local parcel-based data systems for use in neighborhood land 
management. This report has several times noted that local neighborhood- and parcel-
level data systems have improved dramatically in recent years. Some cities have 
assembled and recurrently update a host of good data on almost all of the topics that 
might be considered in assessing foreclosure impacts as discussed above. They have 
shown it can be done. What remains is to spread this type of capacity to the bulk of the 
country’s city and county governments. A national fund should be established to make 
this happen. Given the improvements in local decisionmaking likely to result, the 
investment should pay for itself many times over. 
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